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Abstract This paper studies the link between public policy and corruption for the case of
wind energy. We show that publicly subsidized renewable energy can attract criminal
appetites and favor the formation of criminal associations between entrepreneurs and
politicians able to influence the licensing process. The insights of a simple model of
political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using Italian data for the years
1990–2007. Using a difference in difference approach we quantify the impact of a Green
Certificate policy aimed at supporting renewables, and find robust evidence that criminal
association activity increased more in windy provinces after the introduction of the gen-
erous policy regime. The magnitude of the effect is large: the construction of an average
wind park is associated with an increase in criminal activity of 6 % in the treatment
compared to the control group. Our findings show that in the presence of poor institutions,
even well designed market-based policies can have an adverse impact. The analysis is
relevant for countries that are generally characterized by heavy bureaucracies, weak
institutions and by large renewable potential.
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In Italy, for example, power from wind farms is sold at a guaranteed rate of 180
Euros per kwh, the highest rate in the world. In a country where the Mafia has years
of expertise at buying corrupt politicians and intimidating rivals, the result is perhaps
inevitable, creating a new breed of entrepreneurs known as the lords of the wind.
(The Telegraph 2010).
If you [an energy company] are interested in investing in Calabria, I can reassure you
that it will be like a highway without toll gates. Wiretapping of an ongoing judicial
inquiry about wind power (Corriere della Sera 2012).
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study and quantify the effect of public policy on corruption. As
an example of government intervention, we focus on the case of renewable energy.
Renewable energy provides an interesting and policy relevant case for a variety of reasons.
The energy sector is known to be both a target and a source of corruption, owing to the
characteristics of the energy resources, the possibility of generating rents, and the key
oversight role played by the government. For example, power generation and transmission
as well as oil and gas are among the most bribery prone sectors, according to the Bribe
Payers Index of Transparency International.1 International organizations such as the World
Bank, which have been involved in the financing of energy infrastructure in the developing
world, have recognized the need to reduce corruption, often by trying to strengthen gov-
ernance. As Mauro (1998) suggests, the need for secrecy characterizing the corrupt deals
implies that ‘‘it will be easier to collect substantial bribes on large infrastructure projects
or highly sophisticated defense equipment than on textbooks or teachers’ salaries’’.
Complicated regulations and public spending are among the major factors that can promote
corruption (Tanzi 1998) and both elements characterize renewable energy projects.
Renewable energy is also extremely policy relevant. Renewable sources such as wind
and solar have been growing incredibly fast in recent years, especially in developed
economies and largely spurred by public support schemes aimed at promoting low carbon
energy alternatives. Moreover, policy instruments that promote market flexibility in the
regulation of greenhouse gases have incentivized the trade of emission reduction credits
between developed and developing countries (through the so-called Clean Development
Mechanisms -CDM- of the Kyoto protocol). Renewable energy now represents the largest
share of the CDM projects in the pipeline. Overall, renewable energy provides an
important case for testing whether public incentives fuel rent-seeking and corruption in this
sector.
Anecdotal evidence in Europe and elsewhere suggests the diffusion of corrupt practices
related to public incentives for the renewable energy sector. Several official inquiries made
by the Italian police have been made public, and have led to the arrest of managers and
local politicians who allegedly used corrupt practices and bribes in order to obtain licenses
to build wind farms. For example, according to an inquiry called ‘‘P3’’, the entrepreneur
Flavio Carboni and a former politician Pasquale Lombardi set up a criminal association
able to collect private funds from other entrepreneurs to pay bribes in exchange for wind
farm permits in the region of Sardinia.2 Similar scandals have occurred in Spain, where 19
1 http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/.
2 http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/07/08/news/arrestato_flavio_carboni-5471098/.
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persons were arrested in 2009 on charges of corruption in the wind sector. In the United
States, the bankruptcy of the solar power manufacturing firm Solyndra has led to a con-
troversy over the potential influence of the Department of Energy on the loan guarantee the
firm was granted. Many countries are now evaluating public subsidies implemented over
the past several years with the aim of promoting renewables. In most cases, ex post policy
assessment has focused on issues of efficiency and effectiveness, but has essentially dis-
regarded the role of the main political economy factors at play. To our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to study whether public incentives for renewable energy resources can lead
to an increase in illegal activities.
The main contribution of the paper is to understand whether the presence of a renewable
natural resource, such as wind energy, creates scope for rent seeking practices and cor-
ruption when public incentives make it profitable to harvest the renewable potential. We do
so by first sketching a simple theory of political influence by interest groups, which yields
predictions on the relation between corruption, renewable resources and public subsidies.
These insights are tested on a panel dataset of Italian provinces for the 1990–2007 period.
In the analysis we can exploit the presence of the renewable energy resource (e.g., wind
potential) as inducing an exogenous variation in the expected rent opportunities which
allows us to identify a treatment and a control group of provinces. Using a difference in
difference approach we provide strong evidence that supports our model, establishing that
the expectations of high public incentives in the wind energy sector have fueled corruption
as measured by the level of criminal association activity. Our main finding is that criminal
association activity increased more in the high-wind provinces of the treatment group after
the introduction of the generous public policy regime. The magnitude of the effect is
significant: for an average wind park (of 10 MW) installed after 1999, and which receives
about 1.5 Million euro per year in public support, the number of criminal association
offenses has increased by 6 % in the windy provinces compared to the less windy ones.
Overall, the paper points out that even well designed market-based policies can have an
adverse impact where institutions are poorly functioning. This effect would be greater in
places with high resource potential. This has important normative implications, especially
for countries which are characterized by abundant renewable resources and weak institu-
tions, and thus are more susceptible to the private exploitation of public incentives.
Related literature The paper is mainly related to the literature on corruption, which has
shown how highly regulated environments that render bureaucrats more powerful favor the
spread of corruption practices (Murphy et al. 1993; Tanzi 1998).3 Several studies have
found that corruption is more detrimental to economic growth than taxation (Shleifer and
Vishny 1993; Fisman and Svensson 2006), due to the uncertainty and secrecy required by
the bribing process and the fact that corrupt deals cannot be enforced in courts. Moreover,
corrupt officials might slow down the administrative process in order to collect more bribes
(Myrdal 1968; Kaufmann and Wei 1998). Although we cannot analyze the effect of cor-
ruption on the economic efficiency of renewable energy projects, we contribute to this
literature by finding evidence of corruption in a heavily regulated sector. To our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first which is able to quantify the impact of renewable energy
subsidies on corruption. We also present suggestive evidence that more corrupt provinces
have actually attracted a higher number of wind energy projects, eventually accelerating
the development of the wind sector. This is in line with Dreher and Gassebner (2013) who
3 Olken and Pande (2012), Sequeira (2012) and Svensson (2005) provide a comprehensive review of the
literature on corruption.
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provide evidence supporting the ‘‘grease the wheels’’ hypothesis and find that in highly
regulated environments, corruption eases firm entry.
Focusing on the effect of a raise in the expected rents from wind energy due to a
government intervention, our study is also related to a number of papers that have analyzed
the impact of natural resource rents on corruption, political institutions and state stability
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010; Arezki and Bruckner 2011; Vincente 2010). Vincente
(2010) for example, analyzes the effects of an oil discovery announcement in the Island of
Sao Tome and Principe. The author finds that the announcement increased the value of
being in power for politicians and this in turn created scope for resource mis-allocation,
such as vote-buying. Compared to Vincente, we are interested in the effects of a gov-
ernment intervention supporting renewables on the behavior of economic and political
agents, namely the entrepreneurs operating in the wind energy sector and the local
bureaucrats who grant authorization permits. In this sense our paper is somewhat related to
the literature on the effect of political connections (Fisman 2001), which studies how firms
take advantage of being connected to a politician by circumventing regulation and securing
permits.
The paper also speaks to the literature which studies the effect of public spending on
economic and political outcomes. According to this literature higher levels of public
spending can be associated to worse outcomes. In particular, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)
present cross country evidence showing a positive correlation between public investment
and corruption. Hessami (2010) detects a positive relationship between the perceived level
of corruption and the share of spending on health and environmental protection. We take a
micro-level perspective and highlight that the presence of the natural resource, when
supported by public policy, can attract criminal appetites and favor the formation of
criminal associations. In this context, the actual investments in the sector are not exoge-
nous but driven by the presence of a well established criminal association between
entrepreneurs and politicians able to influence the authorization process and thereby
receive significant public funds.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we discuss a framework which
generates testable implications on the relationship between level of wind, corruption and
the development of the wind sector, Section 3 describes the data and the institutional
background, in Sect. 4 we outline the empirical strategy and present the empirical results
from testing the model, while the final section concludes.
2 A simple theory of corruption in the renewable energy sector
In this framework entrepreneurs can influence bureaucrats or local politicians through
bribes.4 Each province is populated by a politician and a number of entrepreneurs who
decide either to invest in wind power generation by building a wind farm or to carry on
with their previous activity. In order to invest, entrepreneurs in the wind energy sector must
ask the politician for a permit and paying a bribe increases the probability of the permit
being granted since the politician will put more effort in the bureaucratic process. The
entrepreneurs bear some costs associated with bribing, such as the effort needed to keep the
corrupted deal secret. These costs depend on institutional factors such as the level of social
capital or the quality of law enforcement (e.g., the effort required to keep corruption secret
negatively depends on the degree of social acceptance of bribing).
4 A formal version of the model is available upon request.
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Once the entrepreneur obtains the permit, she can make the investment and build a wind
farm. The return on investment depends on the revenues associated with the energy produced
(increasing in the wind level) on one side, and on public incentives on the other. The public
support incentive can either subsidize the building of thewind farm (irrespective of howmuch
it generates) or remunerate the actual electricity generated, for example through feed in tariff
or a tradable certificate system. A regime switch from the first to the second support
scheme would make revenues more dependent on the wind level, and thus provide additional
incentives to build in the windiest sites. The return on investment does not depend on the
ability of the entrepreneur since the wind sector has traditionally been characterized by low
levels of competition and revenues were mainly driven by public incentives.
Because we focus our attention on the first period of the establishment of wind power
generation in Italy, we do not expect entrepreneurs to compete for permits.Whether a province
will experience a corrupted windmarket (e.g., all the entrepreneurs pay a bribe) depends on the
quality of institutions and the wind level. In general the level of wind, which affects the returns
on investment, leads economic agents to enter the wind energy market. In contexts where the
institutional quality is low, the politician’s intervention significantly increases the probability of
obtaining permission and corruption is generally tolerated in the society, high wind will be
correlatedwith ahigher numberof corrupted agents active in thewindenergymarket; if instead,
without the direct intervention of the politician, the entrepreneur faces almost the same prob-
ability to get a permit and corruption is viewed poorly in the society, a high wind level is
correlated with a higher number of honest agents active in the market. Thus, there is a com-
plementarity between windiness and the quality of political institutions in determining the
equilibrium level of corruption, such that considering two provinces with the same wind level
but with a different probability of obtaining the permit via bribing, one should expect a higher
level of corruption in the province characterized by worse institutions. On the other hand,
comparing twoprovinceswith similar institutional quality (and so similar chances of getting the
permits usingbribes) butwithadifferent level ofwind, one shouldexpectmorecorruption in the
high-wind province. The intuition is simple; since themarginal return to bribing is increasing in
the wind level, we should expect a higher number of entrepreneurs entering in high-wind
provinces and bribing the politician. The negative effect of windiness will be stronger in
provinces characterized by a lower institutional quality. In the same way, a lower quality of
institutions increases the number of corrupted entrepreneurs in the market, and it does so more
in high-wind provinces that entail a larger marginal profit.
Another important implication of this framework is that the introduction of amarket-based
system in a context of poor institutions would lead to a greater increase in corruption in
provinces characterized by a higher wind level. If higher amounts of public incentives
increase the return towind investments and lead a larger number of agents to enter themarket,
when the quality of institutions is low all the entrants pay a bribe in exchange for the permit
and the level of corruption increases. Moreover, if the public incentive becomes more
responsive to the actual energy generated (i.e. to the wind level), this effect becomes stronger
in highwind provinces. Therefore, in the presence of poorly functioning institutions, amarket
based policy might actually have a larger negative impact, particularly where the greatest
efficiency gains could be obtained, namely in provinces with the highest resource potential.
Note that an increase in the returns to bribing (due to a change in the wind level, the
public policies or the quality of institutions), will increase the equilibrium level of cor-
ruption and, as a consequence, also the actual number of wind projects put in place. This is
due to the fact that in this framework corruption helps to cut the red tape, eventually
accelerating the development of the wind sector. Though in principle corruption can also
hamper the development of an industry by imposing additional and unnecessary costs, the
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evidence accumulated in the official inquiries is consistent with the first hypothesis (see
Sect. 3.1).
Having outlined the main factors which can fuel bribing in the emerging market of wind
energy, we turn to our empirical exercise. We focus on the role of the wind level in
determining corruption in a region characterized by weak institutions. Since the data cover
a sufficiently long time period, we can analyze the effects of the transition between the two
major policy regimes implemented to promote wind energy. The main predictions of the
theory which we take to the data are the following:
(i) Ceteris paribus, the windiest provinces are more likely to experience corruption.
(ii) The increase in the remuneration of wind investments, due to the introduction of a
market-based policy regime, leads to an increase in the extent of corruption,
especially in high-wind provinces.
3 Background and data
3.1 Wind power in Italy
The incentives schemes to renewables, including wind power, began in 1992, when a feed-
in tariff known as CIP 6 was introduced to support renewables and ‘‘assimilated sources’’.5
The feed-in tariff system managed to jump start investments which were important at a
time of shortage of available power capacity, but also uncovered several flaws.
In order to overcome these pitfalls, and following the liberalization of the Italian electricity
market, in 1999 a market-oriented mechanism based on tradable green certificates (known as
‘‘Certificati Verdi’’, CV) was implemented; this required power producers and importers to
have a minimum share of electricity generated by renewable sources. The quota was set for the
initial date of operation in 2001 at 2 %, gradually increasing over time (it is now 7 % ). Green
certificates can be exchanged on either the Italian electricity market or via bilateral contracts,
and last for several years (12 and 15 years if issued before and after 2007 respectively). In the
initial phase, an excess of demand pushed the prices of the green certificates up, from 99 Euro/
MWh in 2003 to 142.8 Euro/MWh in 2006. In addition to the CV incentives, revenues also
accrue for electricity generation, thanks to priority dispatch to the electricity market or alter-
natively to the option of selling electricity at a minimum guaranteed price. The financial
incentive regime for investment in renewables in Italy appears to be advantageous by inter-
national standards. The Italian energy authority has estimated the cost of the green certificate
trade system at 400 million Euros in 2008 and at 1 billion in 2013. In addition, regional and
provincial support schemes have also been put in place. The contribution of wind power has
increased significantly after the introduction of theCV incentive system, and nowcontributes to
almost 4 % of the national electricity consumption. Virtually all the installed wind capacity is
concentrated in the ‘‘Mezzogiorno’’, which hosts the largest wind potential (see Fig. 1 below).
The provinces of Foggia (FG), Benevento (BN) and Avellino (AV), which lie on the
windy ridge of the south Appennines, host roughly one third of the whole national
5 The terminology has allowed several other sources, including thermal co-generation, to be included
among the beneficiaries of the feed-in tariff, which has undermined the effectiveness of the policy in
promoting traditionally renewable energy. Though the exclusion of ‘‘assimilated’’ sources from the
incentives has been mandated in the European directive 2001/77/CE, a series of waivers have allowed this
practice to persist to date.
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capacity. These sites, together with the ones in Sardinia, were also the first to develop, and
are characterized by higher utilization factors. More recently wind power has considerably
expanded to several provinces of Sicily and Calabria.
Within the provinces, these rents are concentrated in a subset of municipalities, often of
small size and located in areas with low population density. Thus, the royalties that the
wind parks can yield to the local authorities (either legally or illicitly)—in exchange for the
construction authorization—can be considerable, enough to induce corruption practices.
Until 2010, there were no official guidelines on the rules for determining such royalties,
and these were left to the discretion of local authorities, without any national harmo-
nization. In addition, region-wide energy plans have been introduced quite slowly,
allowing for a quite unregulated environment, which for example has only been partially
able to account for other factors such as the integration with the electricity grids. Though
the magnitude of the incentives is large, it is important to note that the wind sector still
represents a small fraction of the overall economic output. The share of wind profits over
the total value added of the economy does not exceed 2 %, even in the provinces most
favorable to wind.
For the sake of our analysis, we assume that the regime change that the green certificate
system brought about in 1999 (with effective use from 2001) can be considered the real
turning point for policy. In the language of our model, this policy break has increased the
return to wind investment and thus motivated more illicit activities. Although policies
Fig. 1 Map of wind resources in Italy (speed at 75 m height). Source: CESI
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supporting renewables were present in the country even before the turn of the century,
there are various reasons to support the idea that the green certificate system represented a
significant and exogenous policy regime switch. First, the commitment to renewables of
the European Union strengthened markedly around that time, culminating in the Renew-
able Energy Support (RES) directive which took effect in 2001 and set national indicative
targets for renewable energy production from individual member states for the years 2010
and 2020. This increased the certainty of the policy support schemes for renewables, also
providing a long term perspective in terms of quotas. Second, the liberalization of the
Italian electricity market and the increased dynamics of the international energy markets,
with oil prices starting to rise in 1999 and especially after 2001, provided an increased
opportunity to enter a sector which was traditionally monopolistic. Finally, the wind tur-
bine technology improved dramatically over time: the investment costs dropped consid-
erably, from roughly 2000 to 1000 US$/kW. The reliability of the technology also
increased, as it became better suited to handle times of strong winds. Thus, the green
certificate (CV) system marked a clear change in terms of public support to the deployment
of wind power, as testified by the marked increase in installed capacity post-2000.
The questions of interest for us are, (a) whether corruption practices have been fueled by
the expectation of huge profits (due to public incentives) in windy provinces and conse-
quently, (b) if there is a positive correlation between the development of the wind energy
sector and corruption.
3.2 Data description
We use a panel dataset for the period 1990–2007with annual observations on 34 provinces of
Southern Italian regions.6Wemake use of a data set compiled by the ItalianNational Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT, ‘‘Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali’’) to measure criminal activity in the
country. To compute the extent of corruption we use two measures: (a) criminal association
activity (CrimAssoc), representing the number of ‘‘Criminal Association’’ offenses brought
to justice by the five sectors of the police force, and (b) total criminal association
(TCrimAssoc), the sum of offenses related to ‘‘Criminal Association’’ and ‘‘Mafia-related
Criminal Association’’. Values are reported in terms of incidence per 100,000 inhabitants.
Criminal association activity represents a very good measure of the level of corruption in the
wind energy sector since, according to the Italian penal code, ‘‘it implies a sufficiently
stable organization of two or more individuals who agree on committing illegal activities’’.
This is exactly the case of the local bureaucrat which systematically exchanges authorizations
for building wind farms for bribes from entrepreneurs. Actually most of the persons involved
in corruption activity in the wind energy sector have been charged with this type of offense.7
The set of controls includes the log of real GDP per capita and the secondary school
enrollment at the provincial level as provided by ISTAT. These controls are widely used in
the crime literature and represent potential determinants of criminal behavior measuring
the expected earning and cost opportunities. We also control for the population density in
the province which is considered a key driver of the level of criminal activity (Glaeser and
Sacerdote 1999). Finally we include the index of violent crime as a control to account for
criminal attitudes in a given province. This is computed on the basis of the offenses
6 For sake of comparison, Italian provinces are similar in size to US counties. During the period analyzed,
six new provinces were instituted in the South of Italy. We disregard changes to the 1990 province
classification, and attribute data on new provinces to those they originated from.
7 See the example reported in Sect. 1.
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brought to justice by the five sectors of the police force regarding the following crimes:
massacre, homicide, infanticide, assault and battery, sexual assault, kidnapping, assassi-
nation attempt and theft. Table 1 below reports the descriptive statistics for all the
variables.
The expected number of projects is proxied by the number of wind plants and the total
capacity installed; for this purpose, since official statistics at the provincial level are only
available from 2008 onwards, we rely on a dataset compiled by ANEV (National Asso-
ciation for Wind Energy). This covers the totality of wind parks and provides data on the
location, capacity, size, year of initial operation, and ownership. Wind level is computed
using data from the Italian Wind Atlas, which provides the average wind level per square
kilometer for the whole Italian territory.8
In order to assign each province to a certain class of wind, we construct our own
measure of windiness. We first consider the distribution of wind level (wind level per
square kilometer) across the whole territory of the 34 provinces in our sample and we use
the third quartile, or 5.2 m/s, as the threshold to define a one square kilometer area as high
wind. Since the aim of our measure is to capture the attractiveness of the province for
hosting wind parks, we take into account the percentage of the provincial area lying above
that threshold while we give relatively less importance to the peaks in the distribution. The
distribution of the quota of the provincial area lying above the 5.2 m/s threshold is then
used to identify the windiest provinces in the sample. For instance, the 8 windiest
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Standard deviations in
parenthesis
Variables Mean Min Max Obs.
Crim Assoc 2.277 0 13.843 612
(1.775)
TCrim Assoc 3.034 0 13.843 612
(2.342)
Violent crime Index 115.018 14.017 558.863 612
(72.496)
Clear_Up 0.332 0.094 0.721 476
(0.115)
Wind_Index 1.227 0.211 3.469 612
(0.95)
Wind Plants 2.236 0 44 612
(4.848)
Capacity (MW) 18.123 -0.6 642.17 612
(54.356)
GDP_pc (Log) 9.490 8.941 10.134 612
(0.184)
School 0.814 0.355 1.17 612
(0.12)
Population 609,323 89,043 3,117,095 612
(54,4902.4)
Pop_Density 176.778 30.87 1881.168 612
(299.849)
8 Wind speed is computed in meters per second (m/s) at 25 m above the sea level.
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provinces are the ones with more than 25 % of their area above the 5.2 m/s threshold, the
following 9 windiest provinces have between 17 and 25 %9 of their area lying above the
same threshold, and so on. The specific level of windiness that our measure assigns to each
province corresponds to the quota of the provincial area lying above 5.2 m/s multiplied by
the average windiness above the same threshold.10
3.3 Measurement issues
A well known issue in crime-related literature is the problem of using counts of reported
crimes. This can lead to the underestimation of the true number of committed crimes and bias
the estimates if the explanatory variables of interest are correlated with the level of under-
reporting. In our case, the bias in reporting originates from the police investigative activity:
criminal association is a difficult crime to detect as it usually does not involve a direct victim
with an interest to report to the police. Rather, it is usually the police that report this type of
offense to the judiciary after an investigation process. In this analysis our major concern is to
measure criminal association levels rather than the extent of investigation activity by the
police. Ehrlich (1996) extensively discussed the reporting bias in crime data and proposed
several remedies.11 We use one of them, recently adopted by Fougere et al. (2009) and
Bianchi et al. (2012), which consists of exploiting the panel structure of the data including
time and province fixed effects. This method is very effective since it takes into account any
systematic difference in police reporting activity between provinces (over time) or between
different times (across provinces). We also include province specific time trends which
allows for time varying, province specific bias in crime reporting by the police. Finally, we
further address this issue presenting some descriptive evidence12 on the clear-up rate, a
measure of the efficiency of police activity, which is defined as the ratio of crimes cleared up
by the police over the total number of reported crimes.
4 Methodology and results
The main hypothesis we want to test is whether the presence of a renewable natural resource,
namely wind energy, can favor the spread of corruption practices, especially in the presence
of public policies such as subsidies increasing the expected returns of investments in wind
energy. Given that profits in the Italian wind energy sector started to increase after the
introduction of the green certificate (CV) system when significant public incentives were
granted, we would expect an increase in corruption especially after that period. In turn, the
increase in corruption should fuel the actual expansion of the wind energy sector.
4.1 Suggestive evidence: corruption and wind energy development
As a motivation for our analysis, we start by offering some descriptive evidence on the
association between corruption activity and the actual expansion of the wind energy sector.
9 These percentage values represent respectively the second and the third quartile of the distribution of the
quota of provincial area lying above the 5.2 m/s threshold.
10 The figure reporting the distribution of the Wind Index across all the provinces in the sample is shown in
Appendix 1.
11 See also Levitt (1996), Fougere et al. (2009) and Gould et al. (2002).
12 We cannot include this measure in the regressions since the data are only available until 2003.
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If the mechanism described above has actually been the one at work, we would expect to
observe a larger expansion of the wind energy sector in provinces characterized by a higher
level of criminal association activity. In addition, this effect should be stronger among the
windiest provinces and after 1999, when the expected returns of the investment signifi-
cantly increased. We measure the size of the wind energy sector with the total installed
capacity and analyze whether the level of criminal association activity at time t  1 in
province i, is correlated with the capacity (MW) installed in the same province at time t,
and how this correlation varies for provinces with different wind levels. Given that cor-
ruption activity is associated with the authorized capacity but in the data we observe the
actual capacity installed, we include the lagged value of criminal association since it is
reasonable to assume at least a one year lag between authorization and installation. We
estimate the following fixed effects model:
Capacityi;t ¼ cþ aCapStocki;t1 þ bCrimAssoci;t1 þ cInterCrimAssoci;t1 þ xi;td
þcitrendi;t þ zit
where InterCrimAssoci;t1 represents an interaction term between a post-1999 dummy
(=1 for every year between 1999 and 2007), and the lagged value of criminal association
activity. zit represents the error term, which is zi;t ¼ uiþ vtþ i;t, where ui and vt are
province and time effects, and it is an observation specific error. As a control, we have
included the lagged stock of capacity installed in the province. Capacity can be influenced
by its existing stock in two ways; on one hand our measure of capacity also accounts for
the enlargement of an existing wind park, in terms of Megawatts added, therefore one
would expect a positive correlation with the stock of capacity in the previous period. On
the other hand, given the limited space available in a province for new plants, it is
reasonable to assume that existing installations, both in terms of total capacity and total
number of wind parks, influence negatively the installation of future ones. The vector of
controls also includes GDP per capita and school enrollment, which account for the general
level of socio-economic development of the province and the density of population which
affects the space available for new wind energy installations.
The coefficients of interest are b and c; they illustrate whether criminal association
activity is correlated with wind power installations and if the correlation becomes stronger
after 1999, when the expected returns to wind energy started to increase and so did the
attractiveness of the sector. We first estimate equation for all the provinces in the sample,
then we repeat the estimation comparing the eight windiest provinces to the eleven
neighboring provinces. In this case we perform a difference in difference exercise in which
we compare the two groups of provinces before and after 199913 and we evaluate whether
the correlation between criminal association activity and wind power installations is
stronger for the high-wind provinces of the treatment group than for the neighboring
provinces of the control group. Table 2 reports the estimation results.14
In columns 1 and 2 we look at the simple correlation between the lagged value of
criminal association and the capacity installed, considering all 34 provinces in the South
13 In this case we estimate a similar equation, but we interact the two variables of interest with a ‘‘treat-
ment’’ dummy identifying the group of the eight windiest provinces.
14 We only present the results for criminal association activity. Tables for total criminal association are
available upon request.
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region, while in columns 3 and 4 we compare the treatment group to the control group. In
columns 1 and 3 only the lagged value of criminal association activity is included, while in
columns 2 and 4, the baseline specification is enriched with an interaction term to account
for the effect of the lagged value of criminal association in the post-1999 period.
In columns 1 and 3, the coefficient of the lagged value of criminal association is positive
and significant in the baseline specification but becomes insignificant in columns 2 and 4,
where the interaction InterCrimAssoc is always positive and significant. Notice that the
size and significance of the coefficients of interest is much larger when we move to column
3 and 4, where we focus on the high wind provinces and compare them to the neighboring
provinces. Results in Table 2 show that the positive correlation between the level of
criminal association activity at time t  1; and the installed capacity at time t, is stronger in
the high wind provinces of the treatment group, with a rise of this effect after 1999. This
evidence is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework and documents the
fact that the wind sector developed more in provinces with higher criminal association
activity. In particular it suggests that, in high wind provinces where economic agents and
bureaucrats, motivated by the high expected revenues, have been better ‘‘organized’’ and
ready to engage in criminal association activity (resulting in more permits and conces-
sions), the expansion of the wind energy sector has been higher.
It is very difficult to empirically analyze the association between criminal association
activity and wind capacity installed, since there might be confounding factors affecting
both corruption activity and the expansion of the wind energy sector. Though we partially
address the problem of endogeneity by adding the lagged value of criminal association as
an explanatory variable, including a full set of fixed effects as well as province specific
time trends, and having a treatment group which is exogenously determined, this evidence
should only be taken as suggestive.
Table 2 Installed capacity and criminal association activity
VARIABLES (1)
Capacity (MW)
(2)
Capacity (MW)
(3)
Capacity (MW)
(4)
Capacity(MW)
Stock_Capacityt1 0.025 0.028 0.014 0.018
(0.095) (0.096) (0.106) (0.108)
Lag CrimAssoc 0.797* 0.263 2.381** 0.542
(0.462) (0.291) (1.067) (1.462)
inter_CrimAssoc 0.996* 2.458**
(0.571) (1.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 578 578 323 323
R-squared 0.497 0.500 0.525 0.258
Number of prov_id 34 34 19 19
In first and second column, all 34 provinces of the South of Italy, in third and fourth column, provinces of
the treatment and control groups only. inter_CrimAssoc is the interaction between the lagged value of
criminal association activity (Lag CrimAssoc) and the dummy for the post-1999 period (1999–2007).
Province specific time trends are included and clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Control variables
included are: School, log of GDP per capita, Population density and Violent crime Index.
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
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4.2 Empirical analysis: wind resource and corruption
The main purpose of the empirical exercise is to test whether there exists a causal relation
between the presence of a renewable energy resource (i.e. wind) and the spread of cor-
ruption activity and that this relation becomes stronger after the introduction of the
favorable policy regime in 1999. The exogenous variation in wind level across provinces is
crucial to address our estimation in a robust way.
4.2.1 Difference in difference: windy vs non windy provinces
Assuming that all provinces are affected by the introduction of the policy in 1999 pro-
portional to their wind level would be problematic since wind power plants are built only in
provinces with a wind level above a certain threshold. Therefore only a subset of provinces
can be considered to be affected by the policy. Accordingly, we employ a difference-in-
difference strategy (Angrist and Pischke 2009) in which we compare the eight windiest
provinces15 in the area of the South of Italy (treatment group) to the eleven neighboring
provinces (control group). This is done to allow the comparison of two homogeneous
groups of provinces. As mentioned above, in order to identify the windiest provinces we
use a very accurate wind atlas and construct a measure of average windiness that takes into
account the fraction of total provincial area lying above the third quartile of the wind
resource distribution. The provinces in the treatment group have more than 25 % of their
area lying above the 5.2 m/s threshold. The choice of the treatment group in the difference-
in-difference exercise is not an obvious one, since the wind threshold can be set at different
levels. However, as already noted, there are a handful of provinces that host the greatest
wind potential by far, and only very recently has this started to expand. In addition, since
our analysis stops in 2007, the restricted group of eight provinces is the most meaningful
group to look at. The key assumption of the difference in difference strategy is that the
outcome in the treatment group and in the control group would have followed the same
time trend in the absence of the treatment (common trend assumption).16 It is generally
very difficult to prove that the common trend assumption holds, but we are able to
accomplish that both by providing some inspection and visualization of the behavior of the
two groups of provinces and with the estimation exercise.
Figure 2 shows the average criminal association activity in the treated provinces
compared to the control provinces . Since the beginning of the period the provinces of the
control group experience a higher level of criminal association activity. Between 1990 and
1994 both the treatment and control provinces display a similar increasing trend, charac-
terized by a peak around 1992–1994 when the treatment and the control group, experience
a quite large and exceptional increase in criminal association activity,17 followed by a
declining trend in both groups afterwards. Most importantly in 1997 the gap between the
two groups begins to shrink and completely disappears around 2004.18
15 Avellino, Benevento, Campobasso, Cosenza, Foggia, Potenza, Sassari, Trapani.
16 Notice that this does not imply that the two groups need to have the same mean of the outcome.
17 The increasing trend at the beginning of the nineties occurs in the whole Italian territory. In the period
1990–2003, criminal association activity at the provincial level in Italy increased on average by 3.9 % per
year, while between 1990 and 1993 the average annual increase was 22.3 %. Notice that this trend does not
bias our diff-in-diff estimation as long as both the treatment and the control group experience it.
18 A similar pattern for total criminal association activity is shown in Appendix 1.
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One might think that the reduction in the gap is due to a general diffusion of criminal
activity in the treatment group.19 Figure 3 displays the pattern of the violent crime index in
the treatment group compared to the control group. The difference with the previous graph
is striking. The level of criminal activity in the control group remains larger than the one in
the treatment group both in the pre- and post- period, and crucially there is no sign of a
catching-up phenomenon.20
As expected, the windiest provinces have been characterized by a higher level of
installed capacity relative to the control provinces in the whole period.21 The most sig-
nificant acceleration occurred after 1999 and 2002, which provides further evidence of the
structural break of the CV incentive scheme, which was established in 1999 and imple-
mented in 2001.
Results in Table 3 are consistent with previous figures.
Control provinces display a significant higher level of criminal association activity
compared to treated provinces before 1999, but the difference shrinks and becomes
insignificant in the post treatment period. On the contrary, the difference in wind plants and
capacity installed between the treatment and control provinces magnifies after 1999. In
addition, control and treatment groups appear to be similar both before and after 1999, in
other fundamentals, namely real GDP per capita, secondary school enrollment, population
and crucially in the clear-up rate, which can be considered a measure of the efficiency of
police activity. This evidence shows that the difference in difference strategy is valid since
Fig. 2 Criminal association activity (number of offenses over 100,000 inhabitants). Treatment Group:
Avellino, Benevento, Campobasso, Cosenza, Foggia, Potenza, Sassari, Trapani. Control Group: eleven
neighboring provinces. Notice that in 1999 the tradable green certificates system (‘‘Certificati Verdi’’, CV)
was introduced
19 In the robustness section we formally test this alternative explanation.
20 Since the method of reporting offenses changed in 2004, in Appendix 1 we show the pattern of the ratio
between the values in the control and treatment groups, for the three measures of criminal activity. The
comparison is quite striking since we do not find the same decreasing pattern in the ratio of the violent crime
index as in the two ratios of criminal association activity which are characterized by a visible declining
trend, from roughly 2 in the first half of the 1990s (e.g., meaning that the control groups had twice as many
charges per person) to parity in the latest years.
21 The figure displaying the development of the wind energy sector in the treated and control provinces, in
terms of total capacity installed is reported in Appendix 1.
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we are comparing fundamentally similar provinces and rules out the possibility that our
results are driven by an increase in police effort in the treated provinces vis-a-vis the
control ones after 1999.
Turning to the estimation exercise, we use a specification similar to the one first
implemented by Autor (2003), which includes leads and lags of the treatment dummy in
the difference in difference model. In particular we add indicator variables equal to one for
the treatment group in different time windows both before and after the treatment year.
One might be concerned that criminal association activity started to increase in the
treatment group (compared to the control group) before the treatment implying a violation
of the common trend assumption. The inclusion of leads addresses this issue and allows us
to test for the existence of pre-trends in the outcome. The inclusion of lags instead is useful
to analyze how the treatment effect changes over time after the treatment.22 Let TG denote
the treatment group, then we estimate various specifications of the following equation:
CrimAssoci;t ¼ cþ
X1
s¼m
asTGi;s þ
Xq
s¼1
asTGi;s þ xi;tdþ citrendi;t þ ui þ vt þ ei;t ðaÞ
where CrimAssoci;t measures the number of charges made by police forces for criminal
association offenses in province i at time t. The variable of interest is TGi;s, which is a
dummy equal to one for the treated provinces in the time window s and zero otherwise.23
Notice that we include m time windows before 1999 and q time windows from 1999
onwards, where m and q obviously depend on the length of the time windows. xit is a
vector of control variables at the provincial level, namely log of the real GDP per capita,
secondary school enrollment, population density in the province and the level of violent
crime, trendi;t is a province specific trend which accounts for time varying unobservable
factors, ui and vt are province and year fixed effects and it is an observation specific error
term. Our empirical strategy is based on the identification assumption that there are no
22 This specification also accounts for the dynamics of returns to wind energy, our corruption-inducing
variable, which experienced a significant increase after 1999, though largely fluctuating over the time period
of analysis.
23 In other words, TGi;s is an interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the time window s
dummy.
Fig. 3 Index of violent crime
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Table 3 Balanced test
Treated provinces
(mean)
Non-treated provinces
(mean)
Mean difference (p
value)
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Province characteristics
before 1999
CrimAssoc 1.371 2.147 0.155
(0.592) (1.153)
TCrimAssoc 1.681 2.735 0.04
(0.676) (1.549)
Violent crime Index 64.571 117.773 0.02
(18.274) (71.954)
Clear_Up 0.343 0.357 0.396
(0.121) (0.108)
Wind_Index 2.742 1.04 0
(0.584) (0.408)
Wind Plants 2.937 0.136 0
(2.363) (0.258)
Capacity (MW) 9.942 0.351 0.02
(15.184) (0.826)
GDP_pc 9.463 9.399 0.135
(0.126) (0.113)
School 0.814 0.777 0.151
(0.065) (0.079)
Pop Density 91.525 289.723 0.311
(33.148) (532.213)
(B) Province characteristics after
1998
CrimAssoc 1.896 1.962 0.449
(1.394) (0.838)
TCrimAssoc 2.355 2.587 0.346
(1.392) (1.126)
Violent crime Index 99.994 149.669 0.101
(22.272) (103.49)
Clear_Up 0.324 0.319 0.442
(0.078) (0.072)
Wind_Index 2.742 1.04 0
(0.584) (0.408)
Wind Plants 8.678 1.233 0.001
(7.236) (1.229)
Capacity (MW) 76.127 10.064 0.006
(78.579) (12.891)
GDP_pc 9.507 9.498 0.438
(0.076) (0.150)
School 0.907 0.874 0.135
(0.042) (0.072)
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unobservable factors correlated with both criminal association activity and the treatment
group dummy. Formally, CovðTGi;s; ei;tÞ ¼ 0; 8s; must hold. However since the treatment
group is determined according to the wind level, which is exogenous, and considering that
we include province, year fixed effects and province specific time trends, it is difficult to
imagine any unobservable factor correlated with both our dependent variable and the
treatment group dummies.
In all specifications we use both clustered standard errors at the provincial level and
bootstrapped (clustered) standard errors in order to deal with the relatively small number of
clusters (19) and the potential presence of serial correlation in our dependent variables. We
first run a specification of equation (a) that studies the trend of criminal association during
the whole period and it is useful to rule out the presence of trends in our dependent
variables before 1999. So we set m; q ¼ 2, and divide the entire period in four time
windows of 4 years each. Then we focus only on the period post-1999, following the
approval of the Green Certificate System (CV) and split it in two time windows of four
years each (m ¼ 0; q ¼ 2) and four time windows of two years each (m ¼ 0; q ¼ 4)
respectively. All these specifications are useful because they account for a gradual effect of
the policy. Given our hypothesis, we expect the coefficients of interest, fasg with s[ 0 to
be statistically higher than the coefficients fasg with s\0 and 8m; q. For this purpose we
present some tests of significance of the difference in the coefficients before and after
1999. In order to further address the problem of serial correlation which might affect the
dependent variables, we make use of an additional specification to study the trend of our
variables of interest in the treated provinces, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). In
particular, we take the average of all variables before and after 1999 and we estimate the
following equation in a panel with a time dimension equal to two:
CrimAssoci;t ¼ cþ aPOSTi;9905 þ xi;tdþ ui þ vt þ ei;t ðbÞ
where POST is a dummy equal to one for the treated provinces in the second period, and
zero otherwise. To keep the before and after period sufficiently balanced, we restrict the
sample to ten years (1995–2005), such that the averages correspond to the period
1995–1998 and 1999–2005, respectively.24
Turning to the estimation results, Table 4 reports estimates of equations (a) when setting
m; q ¼ 2 and m ¼ 0; q ¼ 2, for criminal association activity in the first two columns, and
for total criminal association activity in columns 3 and 4.
Results for criminal association activity show an increasing trend in our coefficient of
interests belonging to fasg in equation (a), with two of them only marginally insignificant.
Table 3 continued
Treated provinces
(mean)
Non-treated provinces
(mean)
Mean difference (p
value)
(1) (2) (3)
Pop_Density 90.401 289.395 0.152
(32.598) (528.014)
Obs. 8 11
Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1) and (2)
24 The restriction to 10 years is done because our sample is characterized by large T and the serial
correlation can be particularly severe in this case. Moreover and most importantly the precision of the
Bertrand et al. (2004) method decreases with sample size.
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Column 3 displays a similar trend for total criminal association activity, but we find
positive and also significant coefficients associated to the 1999–2002 and 2003–2007
periods. In Table 5 we report the test of significance of the difference of the coefficients
Table 4 Trend in simple and total criminal association in the whole period (1990–2007) for the 19
neighboring provinces
VARIABLES (1) CrimAssoc (2) CrimAssoc (3) TCrimAssoc (4) TCrimAssoc
TG91 94 0.221 0.690
(0.601) (0.712)
(0.638) (0.824)
TG95 98 0.298 0.853
(0.689) (0.707)
(0.871) (1.003)
TG99 02 1.266 0.892 2.094 1.030
(0.962) (0.415)** (1.078)* (0.521)*
(1.198) (0.440)* (1.355) (0.491)**
TG03 07 2.257 1.785 3.305 1.979
(1.265)* (0.492)*** (1.539)** (0.688)**
(1.631) (0.677)** (1.834)* (0.781)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 342 342 342
R2 0.325 0.325 0.303 0.301
Number of prov id 19 19 19 19
TGi is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces in the treatment group for the period i, and zero otherwise. All
columns report FE estimates with the inclusion of province specific time trends. Clustered standard errors at
the province level and clustered bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Control variables included
are: School, log of GDP per capita, Population density and Violent crime Index
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
Table 5 Tests of the coefficients significance
Ho p value Ho p value
CrimAssoc TCrimAssoc
Cluster SE Cluster SE
TG91 94 ¼ TG95 98 0.8664 TG91 94 ¼ TG95 98 0.7889
TG95 98 ¼ TG99 02 0.0505 TG95 98 ¼ TG99 02 0.0503
TG95 98 ¼ (TG99 02þ TG03 07Þ=2 0.0123 TG95 98 ¼ (TG99 02 þ TG03 07Þ=2 0.0222
(TG91 94þ TG95 98Þ=2¼(TG99 02
þ TG03 07Þ=2
0.0393 (TG91 94 ? TG95 98Þ=2 ¼
(TG99 02 þ TG03 07Þ=2
0.062
Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped SE
TG91 94 ¼ TG95 98 0.8808 TG91 94 ¼ TG95 98 0.7734
TG95 98 ¼ TG99 02 0.0577 TG95 98 ¼ TG99 02 0.0288
TG95 98 ¼ ð TG99 02þTG0307Þ=2 0.0316 TG95 98 ¼ (TG99 02 ? TG03 07Þ=2 0.0161
(TG91 94þTG95 98Þ=2 ¼
(TG99 02þTG03 07=2
0.0814 (TG91 94þTG95 98Þ=2 ¼
(TG99 02þ TG03 07Þ=2
0.0454
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before and after 1999. The results clearly show no evidence of a pre-trend in our dependent
variables; the increase in both simple and total criminal association activity occurred in the
treatment compared to the control group appears to become positive only in the post-1999
period. Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of the coefficients in column 1.
The estimation results for the specification of equation (a) in which we only focus on the
post-1999 period are shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4; for both measures of criminal
association activity, all coefficients of interest belonging to fasgs[ 0 are positive and
significant.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 report the results for equation (a), where the post-1999
period is divided into four time windows (q ¼ 4); for both dependent variables, the
coefficients increase over time in significance and magnitude. In particular, from column 1,
it is evident that the treatment group experiences a progressively higher increase in
criminal association activity compared to the control group. Columns 2 and 4 display the
results for equation (b). Recall that we collapse the panel in two time periods (1995–1998,
1999–2007), a method suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) which represents a simple
remedy if variables of interest are serially correlated.
Note that a, the coefficient of interest, is significant both for total criminal association
and for criminal association. As described in the theoretical framework , corruption is
driven by the revenues in the wind energy sector. Although the revenues increase sub-
stantially after 1999, their trend oscillates over time both before and after 1999, therefore
the specifications with the time windows are the most appropriate to be used here. However
looking at longer time periods is a very effective way to provide a synthetic description of
the reality. The size of the effect which we find is remarkable; after the introduction of a
green certificate system high wind provinces experienced on average an increase of  0:9
(per 100000 inhabit.) of association activity crimes ( 1 for the total criminal association
activity) compared to the neighboring provinces. This is very sizable given that the average
crime level in the sample is of about 2 (per 100,000 inhabit.). It might seem surprising that
such large effect on province wide corruption has been driven by a sector, which represents
-2
0
2
4
6
(1991_1994) (1995_1998) (1999_2002) (2003_2007)
Confidence Interval 95% coeff. estimate
Fig. 4 Estimated impact of the introduction of the green certificate system on the level of criminal
association activity in the treatment group for the years before, during and after 1999. Vertical bands
represent 1.96 times the standard error of each point estimate
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only a small share of the local economy. However the implementation of a wind farm
involves a large number of people, who can potentially be corrupted.25 Therefore in reality
each wind project can be associated with a relatively large number of corruption charges.
All in all, the empirical results in this section are consistent with the predictions of the
theory, suggesting that after 1999 the windiest provinces experienced a significant increase
in both measures of criminal association activity, compared to the neighboring control
provinces. In an area characterized by weak socio-political institutions, the introduction of
the new and more favorable policy regime system had a strong negative effect (in terms of
corruption), especially in the provinces with the highest potential for efficiency gains.
4.2.2 Robustness
Despite a set of strong empirical results, at this stage we cannot completely rule out the
presence of an omitted variables bias. In particular, the trend in criminal association
activity we observe in the treatment group might be due to a spillover effect from the
Table 6 Trend in simple and total criminal association after the introduction of the green certificate system
(1999–2007) for the 19 neighboring provinces
VARIABLES (1) CrimAssoc (2) CrimAssoc (3) TCrimAssoc (4) TCrimAssoc
TG99 00 0.980 0.937
(0.548)* (0.643)
(0.519)* (0.568)*
TG01 02 1.005 1.152
(0.435)** (0.552)*
(0.604)* (0.694)*
TG03 04 1.730 2.063
(0.473)*** (0.630)***
(0.703)** (0.806)**
TG05 07 2.098 1.964
(0.776)** (0.992)*
(0.988)** (1.097)*
POST99 05 0.867** 0.997**
(0.356) (0.394)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 38 342 38
R2 0.326 0.522 0.301 0.450
Number of prov_id 19 19 19 19
TGi is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces in the treatment group for the period i, and zero otherwise. In
first and third column, FE regressions with province specific time-trends. Clustered standard errors at the
province level and clustered bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. In second and fourth column,
panel collapsed in two periods as in Bertrand et al. (2004). POSTi is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces in
the treatment group in the post-1999 period and zero otherwise. Control variables included are: School, log
of GDP per capita, Population density and Violent crime Index
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
25 In the theoretical framework we just assume one bureaucrat and one entrepreneur for the sake of
simplicity.
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neighboring provinces. In the next three sections we provide robustness analysis to address
this issue.
4.2.2.1 Catching-up between treatment and control? Following Gennaioli and Onorato
(2010), we change our measure of criminal activity to understand whether we are merely
capturing a general diffusion of criminal behavior which does not depend on the expec-
tation of rents in the wind energy sector.
For this purpose we re-estimate equations (a) and (b), changing our dependent variable
with the index of violent crime. Results in Table 7 indicate that in all specifications the
coefficients of interest are insignificant and eventually negative, showing a similar trend of
the violent crime index in the treated provinces compared to the control provinces. Another
potential explanation for our results could be that the treatment areas are simply absorbing
criminal activity away from the other provinces because of the increment of economic
activity that may ensue government intervention. To rule out this channel we correct the
main specifications by allowing GDP, schooling and population density to interact with
treatment dummies. In Table 8 we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of these
interaction terms.26
Overall this evidence allows us to reject with confidence the ‘‘spillover effect’’ or
‘‘catching-up’’ explanation, suggesting that in the period under consideration, the treatment
group did not experience a general increase in criminal activity.
4.2.2.2 Using the actual wind measure As noticed above, our results might merely
capture the impact of other factors characterizing the treatment group. To address this issue
we repeat the estimation of specifications (a) and (b) considering the actual level of our
index of windiness; in particular, we allow for different treatment intensities interacting
TGi with the value of the wind index in province i, and now use TGWindi to run the same
set of regressions. In this case our identification assumption implies
CovðTGWindi;ðsÞ; ei;tÞ ¼ 0; 8s: In Appendix 2 we report the results of this additional
specification. Results are consistent with those in Tables 4, 5 and 6, and we find the effects
to be even stronger. These findings provide us with sufficient confidence that we are
correctly identifying the impact of the wind level of our treatment group.
4.2.2.3 Different treatment and control We perform a number of additional checks27 to
show the robustness of our findings changing the treatment group. The first test consists of
changing the treatment group as a whole. In this case the results should disappear. As an
alternative treatment group we consider the eight least windy provinces, which are com-
pared with our original control group. The trends in criminal association activity of these
two groups of provinces do not display any significant difference, which demonstrates that
our results are not driven by unobservable features characterizing the control group. Then
we check whether our results remain valid when we try other cutoffs for the wind index to
select the treatment group. We start dropping Cosenza from the treatment group since this
province displays a level of wind more similar to the provinces belonging to the third
quartile of the wind measure28 and our findings remain valid. As a third check we consider
26 The corresponding tests of significance are reported in Appendix 2.
27 All the results described in this section are available upon request.
28 This is evident from the figure of the wind distribution reported in Appendix 1.
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a larger treatment group, adding the next two windiest provinces.29 As expected in this
case the findings are attenuated. To ensure that our results are not driven by the behavior of
a particular province, we repeat our estimation exercise dropping from the treatment group
Table 7 Trend in Violent Crime Index in the whole period (1990–2007) for the 19 neighboring provinces
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent
crime index
Violent
crime index
Violent
crime index
Violent
crime index
TG91 94 0.106
(0.144)
(0.175)
TG95 98 -0.006
(0.168)
(0.208)
TG99 02 -0.053 -0.037
(0.226) (0.095)
(0.273) (0.101)
TG03 07 -0.175 -0.118
(0.253) (0.179)
(0.356) (0.147)
TG99 00 -0.032
(0.104)
(0.106)
TG01 02 0.011
(0.141)
(0.133)
TG03 04 -0.116
(0.181)
(0.161)
TG05 07 -0.043
(0.284)
(0.185)
POST99 05 -0.022
(0.147)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 342 342 38
R2 0.804 0.803 0.803 0.614
Number of prov_id 19 19 19 19
TGi is a dummy equal to one for each province in the treatment group in the period i, and zero otherwise. In
columns (1)–(3), OLS regressions with time, province fixed effects, province specific time trends and clustered
standard errors at the province level (in parenthesis). In fourth column, panel collapsed in two periods as in
Bertrand et al. (2004). POSTi is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces in the treatment group in the post-1999
period and zero otherwise.Control variables included are: School, log ofGDPper capita andPopulation density
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
29 Agrigento, Nuoro.
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each province at a time. Despite weakening in some cases, as when we drop the windiest
province, Potenza, our results remain robust. During the period under consideration, four
provinces in our sample experienced a secession leading to the creation of six new pro-
vinces. We have attributed the data on new provinces to the ones they originated from to
keep the time series consistent. However one might be concerned that we are disregarding
potential institutional changes taking place after a secession.30 To address this issue we
drop the four provinces that experienced a secession and the results are still valid.31. As a
Table 8 Trend in simple and total criminal association in the whole period (1990–2007) for the 19
neighboring provinces when the interaction terms between GDP, Population, Schooling and the treatment
dummy are included
VARIABLES (1) CrimAssoc (2) CrimAssoc (3) TCrimAssoc (4) TCrimAssoc
TG91 94 -0.044 0.591
(0.578) (0.656)
(0.692) (0.880)
TG95 98 -0.091 0.669
(0.748) (0.813)
(0.961) (1.114)
TG99 02 0.725 0.833 1.614 0.832
(0.985) (0.418)* (1.160) (0.487)
(1.216) (0.547) (1.425) (0.604)
TG03 07 1.709 1.850 2.869 1.922
(1.326) (0.456)*** (1.622)* (0.647)***
(1.671) (0.736)** (1.899) (0.836)**
GDP_TG -1.547 -1.535 -0.700 -1.235
(1.763) (1.926) (2.126) (2.516)
(2.263) (2.021) (2.467) (2.306)
PopDens_TG -0.091 -0.095 -0.217 -0.195
(0.141) (0.130) (0.109)* (0.098)*
(0.207) (0.189) (0.214) (0.202)
Sch TG 7.595 7.360 7.076 8.436
(5.271) (4.896) (6.277) (5.730)
(6.619) (6.012) (6.970) (6.230)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 342 342 342
R2 0.330 0.330 0.309 0.308
Number of prov_id 19 19 19 19
TGi is a dummy equal to 1 for the provinces in the treatment group for the period i, and zero otherwise. FE
regressions with province specific time-trends. Clustered standard errors at the province level and clustered
bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Control variables included are: School, log of GDP per
capita, Population density and Violent crime Index
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
30 We believe this problem might arise only for two of the six new provinces. In fact four of them were
created only in 2005, at the end of the period under consideration.
31 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this check
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last check we enlarge the control group and we compare our original treatment group with
all the other twenty six provinces of the South of Italy. Results remain strong and sig-
nificant also in this case.
5 Conclusions
Recent anecdotal evidence suggests the diffusion of corruption practices in the renewable
energy sector. In Italy, several inquiries have looked into corrupt practices and bribes
conceived with the aim of building wind farms and appropriating the associated public
support. This paper has analyzed the link between public subsidies for renewable energy
and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. To our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to study whether public incentives to renewable energy resources could lead to an
increase in illegal activities. This is a highly policy relevant topic since over the past years
several countries implemented public support policies meant to promote renewables, which
are now being evaluated.
Using a simple model of corruption, we show that in a context of weak institutions
windier provinces are more likely to experience corruption, especially after the introduc-
tion of a more favorable policy regime. Moreover, the number of wind energy projects in a
given province is expected to increase with the extent of corruption. We test these results
using Italian data at the provincial level for the period 1990–2007, and we find strong
empirical evidence that supports the theory, establishing that in the presence of poor
institutions, public policy can fuel corruption. The main finding is that criminal association
activity increased more in high-wind provinces and especially after the introduction of a
favorable market-based regime of public incentives.
Overall, the paper points out that even well designed policies can have an adverse
impact in heavily regulated environments with poorly functioning socio-political institu-
tions, especially in places with the highest potential for efficiency gains. The magnitude of
our empirical estimates is significant: for an average wind park (of 10 MW) installed after
1999, and which receives about 1.5 Million euro per year in public support, the number of
criminal association offenses has increased by 6 % in the high-wind provinces with respect
to the less windy ones.32 These results draw clear normative implications, particularly for
countries which are characterized by abundant renewable resources and by weak
institutions.
Besides establishing a clear link between renewable energy subsidies and corruption,
our paper does not allow to quantify additional welfare impacts. From the very rapid
expansion of wind power installations in Southern Italy one can presume that corruption
has helped cut through the red tape, rather than having reduced the equilibrium provision
under the optimum. There could also be corruption-induced welfare costs which we do not
consider, such as entrepreneurs using ‘‘preferred’’ suppliers of potentially lower quality
building materials, though that would constitute a small share of investment costs com-
pared to the actual wind turbine. However, given the relatively small share of renewable
energy in the economy, the largest impacts of public subsidies on economic development
are likely to happen through increased corruption, which we have shown to be significant.
Since this analysis has been tested on the case of wind power, the results of our study
cannot be generalized to other types of renewables, such as solar or hydropower. In
32 This number comes from back-of-the-envelope calculations based on the coefficient of the specification a
la Bertrand et al. (2004).
Public Choice
123
principle, it could be the case that wind energy, being capital intensive, naturally leads to
oligopolistic markets, where the establishment of connections between few entrepreneurs
and local bureaucrats is easier. Furthermore, when compared to solar, the authorization
process is more difficult, since wind farms necessitate vast areas and generally have a
bigger environmental impact. As a consequence, local politicians have more discretionary
power and the room for corruption is larger. Our research agenda comprises the study of
other types of renewable resources to address this set of issues. In general, assessing the
role of political economy for the case of renewable energy is a fruitful area for future
research since several issues remain unexplored, and at the same time renewable energy it
is becoming a relevant sector of the economy whose efficient control demands an in-depth
analysis of all the main economic incentives at play.
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Appendix 1
See Figs. 5, 6, and 7 and 8.
Fig. 5 Distribution of the wind index
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Fig. 7 Ratios between the level of both measures of criminal association activity and Index of Violent
Crime in the control and treated provinces. Treatment Group: Avellino, Benevento, Campobasso, Cosenza,
Foggia, Potenza, Sassari, Trapani. Control Group: eleven neighbouring provinces. Notice that in 1999,
tradable green certificates system (‘‘Certificati Verdi’’, CV) was introduced. VioIndex is the index of violent
crime, while CrimAssoc denotes Criminal Association activity and TCrimAssoc denotes Total Criminal
Association activity (sum of simple criminal association and criminal association of Mafia type).
Fig. 6 Total criminal association activity (number of offences over 100,000 inhabitants)
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Appendix 2: Robustness
See Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Table 9 Test of the Coefficients provinces when the interaction terms between GDP, Population, Schooling
and the treatment dummy are included (Sample: 19 provinces)
H0 P
value
H0 P
value
CrimAssoc TCrimAssoc
Cluster SE Cluster SE
TG91 94 = TG95 98 0.918 TG91 94 = TG95 98 0.899
TG95 98 = TG99 02 0.084 TG95 98 = TG99 02 0.102
TG95 98 = (TG99 02þTG03 07Þ/2 0.018 TG95 98 = (TG99 02 þTG03 07Þ/2 0.037
(TG91 94þTG95 98Þ/
2 = (TG99 02þTG03 07Þ/2
0.064 (TG91 94þTG95 98Þ/
2 = (TG99 02þTG03 07Þ/2
0.104
Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped SE
TG91 94 = TG95 98 0.935 TG91 94 = TG95 98 0.904
TG95 98 = TG99 02 0.151 TG95 98 = (TG99 02 þ 0.141
TG95 98 = (TG99 02?TG03 07Þ/2 0.062 TG95 98 = (TG99 02 ? TG03 07Þ/2 0.049
(TG91 94þTG95 98Þ/
2 = (TG99 02þTG03 07Þ/2
0.141 (TG91 94þTG95 98Þ/
2 = (TG99 02þTG03 07Þ/2
0.106
Fig. 8 Installed capacity (MegaWatt)
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Table 10 Trend in simple and total criminal association in the whole period using the actual value of the
Wind Index (1990–2007) (Sample: 19 neighbouring provinces)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CrimAssoc CrimAssoc TCrimAssoc TCrimAssoc
TG_Wind91 94 0.154 0.297
(0.205) (0.240)
(0.234) (0.294)
TG_Wind95 98 0.185 0.313
(0.219) (0.231)
(0.325) (0.366)
TG_Wind99 02 0.545 0.314 0.748 0.362
(0.314)* (0.152)* (0.353)** (0.183)*
(0.452) (0.169)* (0.500) (0.184)*
TG_Wind03 07 0.950 0.665 1.229 0.762
(0.395)** (0.186)*** (0.494)** (0.237)***
(0.616) (0.266)** (0.681)* (0.296)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 342 342 342 342
R2 0.328 0.327 0.307 0.304
Number of prov_id 19 19 19 19
TG_Windi (interaction termbetween dummy TG and the actual value of the Wind Index)is equal to the value
of Wind Index for each province in the treatment group for the period i, and zero otherwise. TG_Wiad is the
treatment group fixed effect which varies in the level of the Wind Index. In all columns, OLS regression
swim time province fixed effects, province specific time trends and clustered standard errors at the province
level (in parenthesis). Control variables included are: School, log of GDP per capita, Population density and
Violent crime Index
Significance levels: *** p\0.01, ** p\0.05, * p\0.1
Table 11 Test of the coefficients
H0 p
value
H0 p
value
CrimAssoc TCrimAssoc
Cluster SE Cluster SE
Wind91 94 = Wind95 98 0.842 Wind91 94 = Wind95 98 0.941
Wind95 98 = Wind99 02 0.043 Wind95 98 = Wind99 02 0.045
Wind95 98 = (Wind99 02þ Wind03 07Þ/2 0.006 Wind95 98 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2 0.012
(Wind91 94 þWind95 98Þ/
2 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2
0.019 (Wind91 94 þWind95 98Þ/
2 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2
0.048
Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped SE
Wind91 94 = Wind95 98 0.873 Wind91 94 = Wind95 98 0.941
Wind95 98 = Wind99 02 0.062 Wind95 98 = Wind99 02 0.037
Wind95 98 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2 0.03 Wind95 98 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2 0.017
(Wind91 94 = Wind95 98Þ/
2 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2
0.077 (Wind91 94 þWind95 98Þ/
2 = (Wind99 02þWind03 07Þ/2
0.057
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